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The New SecurocracyOswick, Harney, and Hanlon Cliff Oswick, Stefano Harney, and Gerard Hanlon
The School of Business and Management, Queen Mary, 
University of London, London, UK
Abstract: In recent years we have seen the emergence of a “new securocracy,” a
generalization of responsibility for fighting terror within the public sector. Here we
consider the nature and extent of this securocratic shift. In particular, the identity impli-
cations for the public sector worker are explored and we contend that there is an
inherent tension between “serving” and “policing” the public in many public sector
jobs. We also discuss the way in which a securocratic identity is simultaneously
embraced and resisted. Finally, we present some tentative insights into an alternative
way of thinking about identity work, which offers a means of extending conventional
interpretations.
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The public sectors across a range of states have undergone significant change
in recent years and, somewhat inevitably, much of this activity has impacted
upon aspects of identity at both an individual and professional level. In partic-
ular, there have been identity implications which have been associated with
the advent of “new public management,”[1–4] the introduction of cost cutting
and efficiency initiatives,[5–7] and the integration and blurring of professional
and managerial responsibilities.[8–11]
This article explores the impact of a further perturbation of the public
sector apparatus. Unlike previous initiatives this one has been little studied
by scholars in the field and foregrounds notions of threat, vigilance and
surveillance. We use the term “new securocracy” to describe this emerging
phenomenon. For us, this description captures a state-led emphasis on security
generalized throughout the public sector.
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Here we consider the “grammar of imperatives”[12] that a new securocracy
promotes and the resultant implications for the changing subjectivation of the
public sector worker. This article is propositional in nature insofar as it offers
a polemic rendition of the localized effects (i.e., public sector identity implica-
tions) of a meta-level phenomenon (i.e., the perceived threat of terrorist
attacks). At a meta-level, the state’s conversion of terrorism into a condition
of permanent global war has implications for a new round of primitive
accumulation, or what David Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession.[13]
If it is the case that globalization and the effects of this dispossession are nec-
essarily felt and perceived locally, one can expect a new level of strife in the
composition of the particular in public sector work in Britain. We seek to
monitor this imbrication of the particular and the global in what might has
been described in another register as “macro” and “micro” discourses.[14–16]
There are three main parts to this contribution. First, the character and
implications of a securocratic shift are discussed. Second, the role of the
public sector worker as securocrat is elaborated and the processes by which
worker identity is socially constructed and sustained through the “police con-
cept” are subjected to critical scrutiny. Finally, we present some tentative
insights into an alternative way of thinking about identity work, which offers a
means of extending conventional interpretations.
THE NEW SECUROCRACY
The notion of a securocracy was first used in South Africa to denote those
parts of the apartheid state apparatus that resisted the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. Subsequently, the term has been employed by Sinn Fein to
identify parts of the British state apparatus, which it perceives to be resisting
the peace process in Northern Ireland.
Today the term circulates as a way to name the latest blurring of welfare
and policing initiatives in the state, this time under the sign of anti-terror.[17]
More specifically, we view the new securocracy as a largely negative
phenomenon. It can be defined as a generalized mode of organizing and orienting
public sector administration towards a collective and pervasive sense of vigilance
and responsibility for combating the threat of terrorism. As such, it ensnares and
implicates public sector workers and members of the public in a policing role.
Securocracy has had a nefarious connotation deriving from specific
historical origins, but with the generalization of a securocratic impulse in the
public sector apparatus, the term is becoming more ambiguous and less easily
isolated from the operation of actually existing democracies. Indeed the
securocratic impulse might even be said to be attractive to elements of the
wider public sector today.
For instance, the Public Administration Section Newsletter of the American
Political Science Association states that the September 11th attacks in the
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United States brought a “welcome, though dearly purchased” renewed
attention to public administration in the United States.[18] The editorial reasons
that “administration is the life-blood of power” and “power is necessary for a
country to bring to justice those responsible for causing it so much harm, and to
prevent such devastating attacks from happening in the future.”[19]
The call to involve the public sector generally in the war on terror was
echoed in the same year in the UK by the setting up of the Civil Contingencies
Secretariat. This Secretariat runs UK Resilience, an interdepartmental agency
that “leads the delivery of improved resilience across Government and the pub-
lic sector, including supporting Ministers in developing policy. This includes the
development and promulgation of doctrine.”[20] It coordinates a wide range of
public sector workers in a network of responsibility for the war on terror.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency, the American agency
recently blamed for the callous and ineffective response to Hurricane Katrina,
floated a securocratic scheme on its website after the September 11, 2001,
suicide bombings in which citizens were invited to inform on fellow citizens.
The site noted that “millions of American workers who, in the course of their
work, are in a unique position to serve as extra eyes and ears of law enforce-
ment.”[21] In the ensuing outcry this call to turn in one’s fellow citizens was
withdrawn from the site. But the tenor of this website, like the website of the
Homeland Security department in the United States, remains a curious one,
advocating state power without guarantees to protection.[22] Instead the state
serves only to alert the public to the inevitable risks and threats, as the porous
borders of our environment come under threat from terrorists, microbes,
refugees, illegal workers, criminal gangs, etc.[23] The constant warnings about
new attacks conditions citizens to live in a world not of security, but of securi-
tization, where risk is embraced and managed as both the key to the economy
and the terms of the social contract. In such a securitized world, the securo-
cratic too must embrace the threat and manage the surveillance of risk.
Like the police and politicians who predicted the attacks in London, the
new government agencies presume in both structure and doctrine that the war
on terror will last indefinitely, reminding us of what Walter Benjamin noted:
“the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule.”[24]
Benjamin had in mind both the crises of capitalism accompanying the rise of
fascism in Europe, and the permanent emergency of finding oneself in the
subaltern and working classes under capitalism. Though this state of
emergency is best grasped according to Benjamin from this standpoint of the
oppressed, it is nonetheless a generalized state in which all find themselves.
The London bombing of July 7, 2005, provided a terrible opportunity to
glimpse this generalization of the emergency at work, with many commentators
noting the indiscriminate, generalized quality of the harm as Muslims, men,
women, young, old, supporters of the war in Iraq and opponents, as well as the
bombers themselves, were killed or injured. One’s relationship to the particu-
lar crisis or conflict offered no protection from its ravages.
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The permanent state of emergency has its microprocesses as well as its
principles of general elaboration. One place to glimpse these processes is
among the identities of those public sector workers drafted into the war on
terror, whose lives as workers and as representatives of the state are blurred by
the state of emergency. They must survive as workers, but they must do so
within the context of a new securocracy. Their responsibility is intensified as
this permanent state of emergency comes into view. It might even be suggested
after Benjamin,[25] and Lukacs,[26] that their standpoint as both workers in
crisis and representatives of the state response to crisis offers a unique insight
into the general state of emergency and what it means for those trying to cope
with it.
The historical identities of public sector workers during the Second
World War and in the subsequent Cold War, remind us that there is nothing
new about the contradictory place the state worker as a worker finds himself
or herself. Think for instance of the problem of strikes and labour rights
during Second World War in virtually all the countries involved, when all
workers were state workers, and potentially divided against themselves as
workers and patriots. And the elaborate informant society of the Cold War in
the United States is only now with the opening of the archives coming fully
into view. But although national security has never been outside this contra-
dictory formulation and has always served to undermine the distinction
between the state’s ability to let live and to kill, as Michel Focault might say,
today it takes a new form in the register of anti-terror networks, provoking a
new crisis in identity. As a consequence, our aim is “presencing identity,”
where presencing “captures our sense of being confronted with life afresh as
an effect of crisis.”[27]
Securocracy provokes crisis because it forces the state worker to operate
with an almost purely negative identity category. Other categories as police-
women, train driver, or social worker may persist. But if we follow Irving
Goffman[28] and focus on “the mutual surveillance and vigilance of people
awaiting judgement at every turn,”[29] we can trace an emerging tension, and
also begin to see the way public sector workers deal with that tension.
For Goffman,[30] people are always comparing each other and assigning
traits to each other, both of belonging, but more dangerously, of not belong-
ing, of being abnormal. When the abnormal is the terrorist, the stakes are
obviously high. But the tension of performing an identity under a heightened
permanent state of emergency goes beyond even these high stakes of not
belonging. Because the securocrat is a negative category, a category always
threatening to undermine the very things it stands for, establishing its identity
may be its very undoing. Indeed to establish oneself as properly belonging to
the securocracy is to undo oneself as a legitimate representative of the
democratic state form. From Abu Ghraib prison to Guatanamo Bay to the
prosecution of members of the Lancaster Rifles, securocratic intentions do not
just meld into the practice of state legitimation but undermine it.
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It prompts us to ask if such a securocratic identity is sustainable for the
public sector worker? And how would a public sector worker negotiate this
securocratic embrace, and keep the threat, the risk, the paranoia, from over-
coming that identity? In the spirit of Irving Goffman, one might ask a
number of questions about the sustainability of such a charged identity. For
instance, the public sector worker must continue to present a public face that
is normal, but what is normal in a state of emergency, and indeed is the
contemporary terrorist himself not said to be normal? Can the public sector
worker resort to scape goating to draw attention away from himself or her-
self, without risks to his or her other identities as guardians of all members
of the national community and of being a member of that community? Can
the public sector worker try to dissemble and hide, when this is exactly a
characteristic of the “inscrutable” and “invisible” terrorists? Can the public
sector worker hope to be like every other public sector worker when in
the permanent emergency with these other conditions mentioned above
obtaining no one knows securely what this “everyone else” should look
like? The tensions are clear.
But the tensions are also symptomatic of a deeper tension, brought to
the surface by the visibility of this new crisis. As Michael E. Brown reads
Goffman, these microprocesses point out “the contradictory and therefore
unrealizable commodity form of the individual” where one must manage
one’s identity, dissemble in that identity, depersonalize, and scapegoat
others as part of that identity, and where the accomplishing an identity that is
successfully like other identities only leads to the possibility of being
replaced, interchangeable, expendable.[31] It is nonetheless true that at the
level of micro-process, public sector workers have managed this tension.
(After all, capitalism continues to reproduce itself at all levels). Below we will
explore whether these workers can manage this securocratic element of their
public identities, and if so, how.
THE POLICE CONCEPT OF HISTORY AND THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR WORKER
Feldman[32] suggests that the securocractic state operates by reframing history
into a dichotomy of ideal safe space and a dystopia of fear, threat, and malice.
Hence order is threatened by the circulation of disease, terror, drugs, illegal
workers, refugees, etc. These risks need to be policed but even more they need
to be managed—people profiled, watched, filed and logged, put under
surveillance, and so on. This process increasingly entails the corralling of sub-
populations, e.g., Muslims, HIV sufferers, petty criminals (who are themselves
often equated with minorities), etc. At the local level this profiling is closely
identified with the management of the petty crime that tarnishes social life.
For example, we might cite the London Metropolitan Police’s “safer
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neighbourhoods” policy, which targets abandoned cars, drunks, vandalism,
noisy neighbours, etc., and liaises with the community to do so.[33]
In the register of anti-terror this securocracy entails the profiling of
large populations. Recently, The Muslim Council of Britain protested to
the Home Office Commons Select Committee about plans to stop and
search people within entire vicinities on the basis of what they deemed to
be unfounded, collective suspicion. Such powers, they argue, were being
used to target whole sub-populations indiscriminately. This concern is
apparent in the following comment made to the Home Office Commons
Select Committee:
On the example the Chairman (Metropolitan Police Authority) gave
earlier, this is why the communities lack confidence. We are sure that
the intention of Parliament at the time of drafting Section 44 could not
have been that the whole of London be subject to a Section 44 area
because that means, query, where is the intelligence? You are saying
that the whole of London—including greater London—is covered by
this whim which means that an officer on the beat in Brixton can use
Section 44 powers to stop and search without reasonable suspicion. That
concerns us.[34]
In this police concept of the public sector we are all implicated either by virtue
of being one of the communities who are profiled because of our “objective
guilt” or by virtue of our being part of the services of law and order or,
increasingly, as wider public sector workers and as watchful citizens. How-
ever, the purpose of this police conception is not the end of risk itself. Instead,
Feldman[35] tells us
wars of public safety do not aim at eradication of the policed object,
whether or not it be the terrorist, the undocumented immigrant, or the
drug abuser. Rather, these wars require the continued symbiotic pres-
ence of the policed object in order to justify the continuation and new
elaborations of state sovereignty.
This reflects a state crisis which is part of a larger crisis of capitalism as it
encloses new areas of social life (e.g. bio-diversity), as it globalizes and
peripheralizes part of the core,[36] dismantles large elements of the welfare
state,[37] eradicates other ways of life via conquest, globalizing capital, and
institutions such as the World Bank,[38] etc. The two crises are not unrelated,
they are one and the same as the material nature of capitalism brings with it
the changes and the resistance we are witnessing—it is not simply a result of
neo-cons and their ethico-political choices.
This crisis is generating a new form of state and in its wake must surely
come a new form of state worker? Althusser[39] argues that the state apparatus
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contains two forms that can be separated into the repressive and the ideo-
logical. In his view, the ideological state apparatus would grow and become
increasingly dominant in terms of integrating people into capitalism. The
chief instrument of this was the education system but it also includes orga-
nized religion, the media, etc. The repressive state was to take more of a
back seat—although it would always be necessary to suppress resistance.
Althusser suggested that the major repression had taken place and that the
class struggle moved increasingly to the ideological terrain as the state
legitimized itself and capitalism via ideology (although he constantly
linked the two).
Today’s state seems to be moving in the opposite direction. The state is
increasingly willing (and driven) to use repression both nationally and interna-
tionally and to enclose public sector workers and citizens into disciplining and
profiling subversives in all their forms.
This is not to say that these struggles are not also fought on the ideologi-
cal plain—of course they are, quite where ideology and repression merge and
de-merge is problematic—is counting only American dead repression, ideol-
ogy, or both at once? Indeed, especially at home, these twin pronged attacks
of repression and ideology allow the state to target sub-populations en masse
and yet those who suffer repression experience it in an individualized or at
least an isolated manner. The individuals are always tainted by association,
rumor, suspicion, and so on because many people continue to believe the state
is “benign” – when this collapses, e.g., black America, republican Ireland,
etc., then the state, not the individual or the sub-population, is guilty (at least
in the eyes of the sub-population) thereby further exacerbating the state
crisis and securocracy whilst de-legitimating the state—this may be one of
securocracy’s key contradictions.
The creation of sub-populations, internal and external enemies of the
state, perennial vigilance and the “inability” to end the “risk and threat”
theoretically allows for the ever increasing expansion of the securocratic
state. Using a dramaturgical perspective, but going beyond the dissimulated
“presentation of self ”[40,41] of the individual securocrat, the social enact-
ment of the new securocracy can be conceived of as a form of collaborative
theater. More specifically, we can think of it as a moment of “triadic collu-
sion”[42] where the “carrying off ” a theatrical event involves an elaborate
interplay between three parties (i.e., the director/writer, the actors, and the
audience).
When this collusive element is acknowledged it becomes difficult to
regard an audience as passive observers or recipients of a play; they are impli-
cated in the performance as active co-constructors of the particular dramatur-
gical event. The complex nature of the interaction between the three parties
gives rise to a number of possible scenarios to the extent that the same play
may be well received by one audience on one night but badly received the
next night by another.
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In effect, the operationalization of the new securocracy involves a tripar-
tite relationship that is comparable to that found in the theatre. The alignment
of the respective parties being: the public sector workers as actors, the state
institutions as the directors/authors, and the public as audience. Various
aspects of triadic collusion resonate with the new securocracy as a mutually
implicated piece of drama. Indeed, how these collusions take place will allow
for variability within the securocratic state model, e.g., the UK’s “threats” will
be different from those of the United States - not least because for all parties it
involves the suspension of disbelief—it is real, but it is also not real. The
rhetoric of security is realized as such by all, but is nevertheless treated as a
real phenomenon—just as a play is simply a play, but the parties conspire to
make it seem real at a performative, public level. In order for the social
construction of the identity of the public sector worker as a securocrat to be
realised all parties in the triadic collusion have to play their part. But this can
give rise to contradictions within the collusion? What does it need to survive
as normal rather than as state repression and what will it do to the public
sector worker identity?
CONCEPTUALIZING IDENTITY: SOME CONCLUDING 
COMMENTS
According to Wrong,[43] identity is “the most widely used concept these days
in the social sciences and humanities.” Yet, there remains “an inherent contra-
diction between a valuing of identity as something so fundamental that it is
crucial to personal well-being and collective action, and a theorization of
‘identity’ that sees it as something constructed, fluid, multiple, impermanent
and fragmentary.”[44] At heart of this problem, is the tension between an
essentialist and a constructivist view of identity.[45] Clearly, there are middle
positions such as that adopted by Castells[46] who argues for a primary identity
which is enduring and which organizes and mediates a number of subsidiary
identities.
The discussion of the public sector worker as having a securocratic
identity has unmistakeable leanings towards a social constructivist posi-
tion, not least because it illustrates how “our identities are importantly
fashioned by the texts of media representation.”[47] That said, the extreme
contructivist position is somewhat problematic insofar as it sees identity as
primarily a product of discourse and therefore fails to sufficiently account
for aspects of the unconscious, the irrational, the emotional, and self ambi-
guity.[48] Arguably, the formation of a securocratic identity is discursively
informed, but there are also significant unconscious forces (e.g. negative
associations and connotations) and emotive factors (e.g., fear and insecu-
rity) in play beyond this.
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Much of the extant literature which takes a constructivist stance on
identity accentuates the existence of “multiple identities,”[49] “disrupted
identities,”[50] “fragmented identities,”[51] and “adversarial identities.”[52] The
common feature of these conceptualizations is that an individual is seen as
possessing a bundle of distinct strands or themes of identity that either
compete or co-exist and which are reinforced or transformed through social
interaction. The problem with employing this approach to thinking about
identity is that it relies on an either/or logic insofar as social interaction,
although dynamic and diffuse, is seen as either reinforcing or undermining a
particular aspect of identity. The resultant implication for the public sector
worker is that the meta-discourse of securocracy, the local conversations and
situated actions which occur, serve to strengthen or weaken the adoption of a
securocratic identity. For us, this fails to adequately capture the essence of this
area of identity work.
An alternative way of conceptualizing the social construction of a securo-
cratic identity is to envisage it as simultaneously being embraced and resisted.
The public sector worker has never had a homogenous identity—the police
and the medical occupations have always had different identities. But if the
securocractic state is to become hegemonic, it needs to shift the public sector
identity towards a police conception. This will be different to the traditional
state worker as a provider of goods and services on the basis of need or,
indeed, away from the commerialized public sector worker who has a respon-
sibility to account for resources on private sector lines. [53] This is more than
just managerialism,[54] it is a world where vigilance and profiling of citizens is
a fundamental part of public sector work.
Yet many of the citizens will come from the sub-populations of the public
sector workforce themselves, e.g., London Underground’s workforce is over-
whelmingly from ethnic and religious minorities, London—the UK’s power-
house—is Europe’s most diverse city (bringing with it risk and threat), etc.
hence the public sector police concept may run into the limitations of targeting
the communities upon which it depends for recruitment. In short, the
“swamps” that need policing via all the eyes and ears of the millions of work-
ers are the very places that many of these eyes and ears emerge from. Thus the
state’s legitimacy may be eroded and hence its capacity to securocatise all its
workforce may be limited—as the Muslim Council member said to the select
committee:
For example, the MCB wrote to a thousand organisations around the
country—mosques, community groups—reminding everyone of the
serious threat terrorism poses, the obligations upon all of us to report
anything suspicious and then weeks later stats are published which
confirm the actual evidence that we have received that you cannot
trust the police, they stop and search you willy-nilly and then that just
undermines us.
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Public sector workers and their communities may well resist the discourse as
it pertains to them whilst embracing parts of it that pertain to others (thereby
further Balkanizing society). Ultimately, such contradictions may limit the
securocractic state.
This idea that a particular aspect of identity is simultaneously embraced
and resisted within, and through discourse, fits with Bakhtin’s[55] representa-
tion of language as operating as both a centrifugal force and a centripetal
force. This evocative metaphor has been taken up by a number of social con-
structivists. Gergen states: “The centripetal tendency toward order is coupled
with a tendency toward disorder.”[56] Similarly, Shotter explains in dialogical
exchanges “both centripetal tendencies inward toward order and unity at the
center, and centrifugal ones outward toward diversity and difference on
the borders or margins, are at work.”[57] This perspective is also reinforced in
the observation that “the production of discourse centres on the interplay, if
not struggle, between what Bakhtin[58] termed centrifugal (opening up) and
centripetal (closing off) dynamics.”[59]
For us, the centripetal/centrifugal metaphor nicely captures the concomi-
tant tendency towards order, disorder, and contradiction for public sector
worker identity that is evoked by the new securocracy. Beyond this, it
arguably has wider applicability insofar as it can be utilized as a means of
apprehending and interrogating other aspects of identity construction and
identity work.
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